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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff7Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20041035-CA 
JOHN L. LEGG, : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant/Defendant John Legg relies on his opening brief and replies as follows. 
Matters not addressed in reply were adequately covered in Appellant's opening brief or 
do not merit reply. 
ARGUMENT I 
POINT. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE 120 -DAY DISPOSITION WAS 
"KICKED IN" PRIOR TO FILING OF THE INFORMATION WAS 
AOUEDAUTELY PRESERVED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
1 
This issue was argued and preserved several times in the trial court. 
(R00271 at 26.) On May 6, 2004, Defendant Legg's counsel, Scott Broadhead, argued 
before the trial court, that the date on which Mr. Legg filed his notice with the prison for 
his 120 day-disposition was December 9, 2004. Legg dated his notice on December 9, 
2005. There was a question whether the prison received the request on January 5, 2005 or 
January 8, 2005 based on the prison date stamp or signature date regarding which date it 
was received. The court ruled, stating: 
"You know which one I'm going to take in this case. I mean, I can't speak for the 
DIO in this case and what that may have been. I can't also tell if the 9th of 
December as Mr. Legg has is the date that he signed it. There is no good 
explanation for why it would be 30 days but delivery seems to be triggered on 
delivery to the DIO and so I am either looking at Janaury 8th or January 5th, it's one 
of those two dates. (R00271: pp 28-29) 
At this hearing none of these facts were disputed by the Tooele County 
prosecutor, Mr. Searle. At this hearing Mr. Searle made the argument that his office did 
not receive Defendant Legg's notice until January 16, 2004. (R00271: p32, line 4-7). 
Mr. Searle's next concern is that Mr. Legg has been to court at least three prior times and 
he did not raise the issue until just prior to a scheduled trial date. (R00271: pp32-33). 
Mr. Searle even stated that if Mr. Legg asserted his rights for a 120-day disposition 
sooner, then his 120-day disposition would have begin to run on January 8, 2004. This is 
2 
four days before the information was filed with the court. (R00271: p33, line 7-8) 
On August 23, 2004, Mr. Legg argued these same issues before the court at a 
second hearing. (R00271: pp47-58). Mr. Hogan acted as standby counsel for Mr. Legg 
at this second hearing. Mr. Legg requested this hearing because he did not believe that 
his previous attorney, Scott Broadbent, adequately presented the issues to the court on 
the May 6, 3004 hearing. Mr. Legg, at this August 23, 2004 hearing, stated that he filed 
a grievance with the prison for the way his 120-day disposition was handled by the 
prison. (R00271: pp49-52). He specifically argued how and when the 120 disposition 
time frame began, citing legislative intent and citing several rules from the Utah Rules of 
criminal Procedure and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Legg clearly argued at 
this hearing that the day to begin to calculate his 120 day disposition period should be 
December 9, 2003, the date he filed his Notice with the Utah State Prison. (R00271: 
p52, line 11-12) At this hearing, Mr. Searle argued that calculating the time for 120 
disposition begins the date the information is filed which was January 12, 2004. At this 
hearing Mr. Searle stated that there must be a pending matter before the 120-day period 
can begin to run. (R00271: p53) In other words, the information must be filed before 
Mr. Legg can file notice for a 120-day disposition. Further, at this hearing, the issue as 
to whether the 120 day period began to run November 30th, 2003, the date Defendant 
Legg was arrested under a warrant by the Board of pardons or the date the County filed 
the Information in this matter was argued. Also argued was how Defendant's rights to 
3 
due process would be affected. (R00271: pp56-57) Further, Mr. Legg filed a written 
motion dated August 23, 2004 in regards to all these issues. (R100-103) 
CONCLUSION: 
Mr. Legg and his attorneys brought these issues up several times during the 
course of his case. In certain instances they may not have been as eloquent as the benefit 
of hindsight would demand. However, it is clear that Mr. Legg raised, argued and 
preserved issues before the trial court, including the issue that his 120 day disposition 
should begin December 9, 2003. It was argued whether the time for the 120-day 
disposition should begin on January 5 or January 9, the date the prison recorded 
receiving his demand for a 120 day disposition. 
Argument II 
Defendant supports his section 77-29-2 claim with an Adequate record 
The State asserts that the Court should not review defendants claim that the prison 
breached their duty under 77-29-2. The State claims that there is not record evidence 
that the prison authorities ever knew that the information had been filed on January 14, 
2004. 
The trial court docket record is clear that the prison authorities knew that the 
information was filed January 14, 2005. The prison transported him to court on these 
charges after they were sent orders of transportation at least 8 times beginning January 
4 
26, 2004 until his sentencing on January 24, 2005. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should hold that the charges against Defendant Legg should be 
dismissed because of the failure of the Trial Court and prosecutor to adhere to the 
requirements of UCA Section 77-29-1. Also the Court should hold that the charges 
against Mr. Legg should be dismissed because prison failed in its duties under UCA 
Section 77-29-2. Further, it is not necessary to go into the analysis of plain error or 
exceptional circumstances since these issue were adequately preserved on the record. 
SUBMITTED THIS 1st DAY OF May 2006. 
QIA-V; df><.MK(nW^ 
ALAN J. B U I V I i m S - - ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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TOOELE UTAH - MAY 6, 2004 
JUDGE RANDALL N. SKANCHY PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We'll call the matters of State of Utah 
v. John Legg. They are Cases 041300016 and 041300055. Set 
today on Mr. Broadhead's Motion to Dismiss each of them. 
Go ahead, Mr. Broadhead. 
MR. BROADHEAD: Your Honor, I think the motion filed 
is pretty straight forward. There is one mistake in the facts 
that I cited. On the first paragraph I said that Mr. Legg went 
to the prison or was first incarcerated at the prison on 
December 7th. It was actually December 3rd so he actually had 
the packet for the 120-day disposition for about six days 
before he actually turned it in and signed it and turned it in. 
Other than that I think what's interesting about the 
complaints or that Mr. Legg has, he says that he filled out the 
120-day disposition December 9th, tuck it in the mailbox. He's 
already at the prison, doesn't have long to go. So basically 
it sat at the office of the DIO for approximately four weeks 
before they did anything and that's— 
THE COURT: That is troubling. 
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MR. BROADHEAD: Excuse me? 
THE COURT: That is troubling. 
MR. BROADHEAD: That certainly is not acting within a 
reasonable time. He delivered it, did what he was suppose to 
do. They give them a packet and all he has to do is fill in 
the blanks and stick it in the box. Then when the DIO gets it, 
they sit on it for some period of time and then when they sign 
it, they sign it as being received on January 8th but date 
stamp it January 5th. I don't know what date we're suppose to 
be using, the date stamped date or the day they sign it which 
makes a big difference because if you take January 5th, then 
the 120 days passed yesterday. If it's January 8th, it's I 
guess passes Saturday or whatever the extension would be, 
Monday. So it makes a difference. 
Also, if you go on the December 9 date, it passed a 
long time ago, over a month ago. So it does make a difference 
and so as you read through the statute in subsection 1 of the 
Utah Code section on the 120-day dispositions, it says— 
THE COURT: What's the statutory reference on that? 
MR. BROADHEAD: That's 77-29-1. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BROADHEAD: The subsection 1 talks about 
essentially the delivery and it says "Whenever a prisoner is 
serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail, other 
penal or correctional institution of the state and there's 
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pending against the prisoner in this state any untried 
indictment or information and the prisoner shall deliver to the 
warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority or an 
appropriate agent of the same" so that's what Mr. Legg is 
saying, "I delivered to the warden like they tell me in the 
packet I'm suppose to do, a written demand specifying the 
nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and 
requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be 
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of 
the date of delivery of written notice." I think the Court has 
seen the 120-day disposition in there and it looks like he 
filled it out appropriately. He put down what he thought the 
charges were, the appropriate court. He wrote down "Pending 
against me in Tooele County" so it looks like he was specific 
enough just to say what county it was in, what the charges 
were. So I think he sufficiently filled out a written demand 
with sufficient specificity as to what he was expecting to have 
disposed of. 
Then as far as the 120 days, we talked about the 
different dates that you can consider being delivery which I 
think is troubling. Essentially the Court has numerous dates 
to play with, December 9, January 5, January 8 and then he gets 
to court on January 16. 
THE COURT: You know which one I'm going to take in 
this case. I mean, I can't speak for the DIO in this case and 
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why that may have been. I can't also tell if the 9th of 
December as Mr. Legg has signed is the date that he signed it. 
There isn't a good explanation for why it would be 30 days but 
delivery seems to be triggered on delivery to the DIO and so 
I'm either looking at January 8th or January 5th, it's one of 
those two dates. 
MR. BROADHEAD: And it would appear then that the 
section that talks about what the court should do, also the 
court has to consider subsection 4 of that code section which 
states essentially that "If the charge is not brought within 
the 120 days" it says, "the court shall review the proceedings. 
If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney 
to have the matter heard within the time required is not 
supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for a 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice." So the remedy is to dismiss with 
prejudice unless the court can find that there was some good 
cause for the delay on the part of the prosecution. 
Now, as far as factual finding, Your Honor, I think 
it does make it difficult whether it's January 5 or January 8, 
the day we calculate from and I suppose you can argue either 
date. Sometimes date stamps are wrong but sometimes people 
write down the wrong the date when they stamp something and 
they're writing down and they just misplace the date. I could 
argue either side of that and I know the Court could too. The 
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amount of documents we date through our legal career, I'm sure 
we've all written down a wrong date now and then. 
THE COURT: Yes, we have. 
MR. BROADHEAD: January 5th was a Monday and January 
8th was a Thursday. So it wasn't like someone dated something 
on a weekend. So I think it is troubling. I think, like I 
said, Mr. Legg has a valid argument or complaint that it did 
not take - the DIO did not process his claim within a 
reasonable time. 
Also, it seems that they definitely made an error 
when they processed it. Mr. Legg is - I guess there's another 
prison down there that Mr. Legg knows that where this exact 
same fact situation, his 120-day disposition was dated exactly 
the same way. 
THE COURT: Not these same dates but a similar-
MR. BROADHEAD: No, they exact same dates, date 
stamped the 5th and marked down the 8th. What's also 
interesting, he has one that he sent to Salt Lake because he 
didn't know if these charges were going to be in Salt Lake or 
not - it's in his packet of information and the one that went 
to 
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THE COURT: Maybe a dyslexic clerk at the (inaudible) 
corrections. 
MR. BROADHEAD: I think it's interesting that the 
date stamp is the same on both of his but one is marked 
received the 7th and one is marked received the 8th. He filled 
them both out the same day. So I think the Court has to make a 
factual finding as to the date it's going off of and then 
whether the Court is - if it's picking the later date or the 
earlier date, it has to make some kind of finding if we're past 
120 days, that there was good cause. I think that's the 
factual findings that have to be made today. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Broadhead. 
Mr. Searle? 
MR. SEARLE: Thank you, Your Honor. I think Mr. 
Broadhead makes a very good point. If indeed Mr. Legg did 
deliver the written demand to the prison authorities on 
December 9th, I too am troubled by the fact that it then sits 
there for a month because the statute reguires that it 
immediately be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and to the 
court. I would never argue before this Court that a month 
delay is immediate delivery to this Court and to the 
prosecuting attorney but, I'm somewhat troubled by and maybe 
the court punishes the prison, however the court looks at it, 
by the fact that I don't know there's 120-day disposition until 
they deliver it. 
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THE COURT: And that's really your argument on good 
cause. It's simply we have good cause not to have brought it 
in 120 days because we didn't get receipt of it until— 
MR. SEARLE: Well, we didn't get receipt of it until 
the 16th of January. So the State is put on notice as of the 
16th of January that it needs to put him on trial within 120 
days and he would have gone to trial in that 120 days. Outside 
of that, Judge, the statute says that "for good cause, the 120 
days may be extended." Subsection III says "After written 
demand is delivered as required" so Mr. Legg does indeed make 
his demand, "the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his 
counsel for good cause shown with the prison or counsel 
present, may be granted a reasonable continuance." 
Well, we have sat in this court or been before this 
court three times now. The first one was obviously for a 
felony, first appearance. Then we came back for an arraignment 
- or following arraignment and then for a pretrial conference 
and in each one of those, Mr. Legg and his counsel, Mr. 
Broadhead, were here and courts were - excuse me, Judge, not 
courts, dates were set before this court with their agreement 
and with their approval. So I find it somewhat disconcerting 
that they stand here in court and agree to dates that this 
Court sets and those dates are then put on the calendar and 
then they argue for the 120-day disposition. I think their 
argument, they would have an argument but for the fact that 
they acquiesced to those dates and so he can voluntarily waive 
any certain amounts of time on his 120-day motion, on his 120-
day disposition, when he stands here and the Court says we're 
going to try you on May 11 which is outside the 120-day 
disposition and he and his counsel agree to that* There's no 
objection. There never has been an objection as to dates that 
have been set. Had they objected, then it should have been 
pulled back within the 120 days from January 8th. But without 
an objection, the defendant can waive his time frame for 
whatever extent on a speedy trial which the 120-day disposition 
is, they have acquiesced to that and so even if the Court rules 
that it runs May 6 and we don't have the trial within May 6 for 
good cause would be the fact that they have both stood here in 
court, they have both agreed to trial dates without any 
objection whatsoever that the trial date may fall 11 or 12 days 
outside of the 120-day disposition. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BROADHEAD: Your Honor, may I just respond to one 
last thing? We did find the one that was sent to Salt Lake if 
you want to see it. It's similarly dated. 
THE COURT: Let me take a look at that. 
MR. BROADHEAD: It's date stamped the same as the 
other one yet it's dated received in handwriting different— 
THE COURT: By the same authorized agent. 
MR. BROADHEAD: Same agent. 
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THE COURT: Avertus Smith. 
MR. SEARLE: Alberta. 
THE COURT: Alberta? Do you know her? You haven't 
seen her. I'm wondering if she's older than me and therefore 
she can be dottering in her old age perhaps. All signed by the 
same person. 
MR. BROADHEAD: And as far as the issue of not 
letting anyone know of the problem, Your Honor, I don't know if 
you want to see this or not, Mr. Legg filed a grievance with 
the prison that was date stamped March 30 about the 120-day 
disposition saying, hey, my trial date was set afterwards. So 
although he didn't say anything in court, he got back from 
court on his arraignment date and said, wait a minute, that's 
too late, that's after the time period so he filed a grievance 
with the prison saying, you're not doing it in time. I think 
the only people - I think in fairness to Mr. Searle, he does 
have a valid beef and neither one of use seem to know, between 
the two of us, seem to know about the 120-day disposition but 
Mr. Legg wasn't, I don't think he was playing possum. I mean, 
he wouldn't write a grievance to the prison and say, I got a 
problem if you want... 
THE COURT: All right. I appreciate these arguments 
and I understand this problem. This is what I consider to be a 
serious problem by the prison. As I read the statute though it 
suggests to me that that receipt ought to be as receipted by 
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the prison. I've got two dates frankly to pick from, January 8 
or January 5. Frankly, it appears to me to be irrelevant which 
one of those two dates I pick and the reason for that is, I 
think there's good cause to set this matter over. When I say 
set this matter over, to deny the Motion to Dismiss. It 
appears from the representations of counsel for the state that 
the state, who had no ability to effect this process, no 
ability to know that disposition had been done until their 
receipt of it, didn't receive this until the 16th of January. 
I'm going to have that 120 days run from January 8th which is 
the date that is officially noted as being sworn to by the 
officer at the Department of Institutional - or Division of 
Institutional Operations at the jail, find that I think that 
expires then 120 days, based upon representation of counsel it 
expires on did you say May 10th, Mr. Broadhead? 
MR. BROADHEAD: Yeah I guess-
THE COURT: We have a trial set today but I 
understand from the parties that it's not going to go today but 
I also find that given the fact that we've stood in front of 
this Court on three separate occasions since the 120-
disposition has been made and until the Motion to Dismiss was 
filed, there's been no objection to the setting of trial dates 
within what would otherwise be the window of time for that 120-
day period. That also is a factor that this Court weighs 
associated with good cause why this action wasn't brought 
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within that period of time. 
Now, we have this matter set for - we have - I think 
we have both matters set. One was set for today for trial. 
One is set for the 25th. Today's matter as I understand it 
from counsel is not ready to proceed; is that correct? 
MR. BROADHEAD: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Which one will be proceed on on the 25th? 
MR. SEARLE: Talking with Mr. Broadhead, the state 
intends - we wanted to go forward with the 2nd degree and the 
3rd degree on the stolen vehicle and the arson matter. Mr. 
Broadhead informs me he would like our expert's report to be 
reviewed by an expert for Mr. Legg and Mr. Broadhead and they 
need some time to have that report reviewed. 
THE COURT: Is this expert a footprint expert? 
MR. SEARLE: Arson expert. The State Fire Marshall 
is our expert and they want just to have his report reviewed by 
an independent party at their request. 
THE COURT: That report opines on the nature and 
cause of the fire at the vehicle? 
MR. SEARLE: Correct. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. Does that - so your date of 
the 25th still works? 
MR. BROADHEAD: Well, I have a name, I just don't 
have someone to call. Someone gave me a name - I don't have 
any idea how much time. 
THE COURT: Let's just keep this date set. But if in 
the course of this discovery your preparation requires that you 
need to ask for a continuance, it will be granted, of course, 
assuming that Mr. Legg doesn't object. 
MR. BROADHEAD: So we keep the 25th as a first date 
and if we need more time, we'll go from there. Okay. And then 
we'll just wait on the assault one? Okay, that's fine with me. 
MR. SEARLE: And we provided Mr. Broadhead, 
obviously, with the fire report. The only thing I would ask if 
Mr. Broadhead is aware of this that we do have a witness that 
we're bringing in from Nevada. We had for today, the state had 
purchased an airfare. We made that unrestricted fare so that 
we can transfer that over. I would just ask Mr. Broadhead give 
me maybe three or four days notice if we're not going on the 
25th because he doesn't know from his expert yet, so that we 
don't lose that ticket again, lose that money. 
MR. BROADHEAD: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you counsel. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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Addendum B 
Transcript of Hearing on August 23, 2004 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: GARY K. SEARLE 
For the Defendant: L. DOUGLAS HOGAN 
* -k * 
TOOELE, UTAH - AUGUST 23, 2004 
JUDGE RANDALL N. SKANCHY PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR, HOGAN: Your Honor, John recalls and I verified 
with him again this morning he would like me to act in a 
standby capacity. He would like to represent himself pro se. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HOGAN: I do have a copy of some paperwork that I 
believe is new to the Court that he was hoping to submit today. 
I just need to verify that with him when he comes out. 
THE COURT: Is it lengthy? Is it a new motion? 
MR. HOGAN: Four pages. 
THE COURT: Has it been reviewed by counsel for the 
state? 
morning. 
MR. HOGAN: I've given a copy to the state this 
THE COURT: Okay. State of Utah v. John Legg. It's 
Case 041300016. We're back. I suppose this is a pretrial 
conference. Mr. Legg has decided to make this argument himself 
although Mr. Hogan is standing in as his standby counsel. 
We've had a discussion with Mr. Legg before. Mr. Legg finds 
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1 Mr. Hogan to be acceptable to represent him. He will represent 
2 him at the trial in this case if we ever actually get there. 
3 MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, if I may approach? 
4 THE COURT: Very cautiously. 
5 MR. HOGAN: I'd like to submit it to the Court today. 
6 I've provided the prosecutor with a copy as well. 
7 THE COURT: This is to be part of your speaking 
8 motion on your motion for disposition. 
9 MR. LEGG: Yes, because I suffer a mental element. 
10 THE COURT: Pardon me? 
11 MR. LEGG: I suffer a mental element with my memory 
12 so I had to jot it down. 
" 13 THE COURT: And I reviewed your materials today but 
14 go ahead and say what you need to tell me. 
15 MR. LEGG: Okay. As we know, what we're stuck in, 
16 first of all I need to address the Court on a fact with my 
17 counsel here but I'll do that after this. I wanted to address 
18 on the 120-day disposition that on November 30th, 2003 I was 
19 arrested and booked on suspicion of theft and arson; that on 
; 20 December 2nd, 2003 an arrest warrant was issued by the Utah 
21 Board of Pardons, 122128, which was supported by Trooper Craig 
| 22 Ward's probable cause statement and certified warrant request 
123 080301241; that on December 9, 2003 I filed a request and 
I 24 demand for 120-day disposition pursuant to Title 77-29-1 
|25 subsection I of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure for the 
1 48 
1 
I 
1 offenses of theft and arson, in both Salt Lake County and 
2 Tooele for I didn't know which venue took jurisdiction over the 
3 alleged offenses; that on December 15, 2003 I met with the 
4 contract attorneys for the Utah Department of Corrections, 
5 Freestone and Ingerhoffer requesting information related to the 
6 procedures governing the filing and the rights of a prisoner 
7 has with the 120-day disposition, but was denied any services 
8 for such is prohibited for it relates to a pending criminal 
9 charge and they were bound by contract not to be able to 
10 provide any criminal services which violates inmate's rights to 
11 access to the courts. Their contract is 06039 UDC File No. 90-
12 B/630/10 and the supporting case law in support— 
13 THE COURT: I've got .that. You don't need to tell me 
14 that. Just go on with the facts. I'm interested in your facts 
15 not your— 
16 MR. LEGG: Okay. That on or about January 26th, 
17 2004, I received back copies of both Salt Lake City and Tooele 
18 and since this date, I made endless attempts to retrieve the 
19 policy and procedures FBR10 for I wanted to know the guidelines 
20 for the DIO records office processing of the 120-day 
21 disposition for they had three different dates to go by of when 
22 they were received and felt that it was unfair and unjust for 
23 such was 30 days after mailing it. That on March 27th I filed 
24 a grievance after reviewing partial of the policy and 
25 J procedure, FBR10, for such stated that it shall be processed 
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within a reasonable amount of time. So I filed a grievance 
complaining of the unprofessional conduct and performance of 
the DIO records office, Agent Alberta Smith, in processing my 
120-day disposition pursuant to Title 77-29 of subsection II, 
and asking for such error to be corrected before such 
discrepancies arose in the court and the grievance's reference 
number is 990853689 and since filing of a grievance, it was 
ignored with no urgencies considered, taking over 30 days to 
respond to it and which consisted of Sargent Jesse Beals of the 
DIO records office going beyond his scope of duty and start 
coordinating with Deputy County Attorney Gary Searle, with 
trying to relieve the Department of Corrections of any 
wrongdoing and in so they began twisting and distorting the 
meaning and instructions and the intent of Title 77-21 out of 
text and to fit the form of their activity. And in doing so, 
they both acted in a deliberate and indifferent manner that 
constituted bad faith and prosecutorial misconduct in which I 
have filed a new formal complaint against Gary Searle with the 
Utah Bar Association for denying me of my substantial and 
procedural safeguards of due process in creating conflict 
within the court he operates in which violates both moral and 
ethical principles of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.11, 
excessive government and private employment. For we need to 
consider that the burden lies upon the prosecution to bring 
such information to trial within 120 days of the service of the 
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120-day disposition. 
For the unprofessional conduct and actions of both 
Sargent Jesse Beals and the Deputy County Attorney Gary Searle, 
created a lot of conflict within this court and the ineffective 
assistance of counsel with the representation falling below the 
objective standards and the 2-pronged test of Strickland v. 
Washington and the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration which resulted in me not being 
able to challenge the wrongful acts without having to be prone 
to being incarcerated for up to 268 days of today. 
For the issues related with the computation of the 
120-day time frame and how and when such time frame starts, all 
we need to do is look at and understand the legislative intent 
and the relevant rules governing the commencement of an action 
pertaining to a prisoner and then the action, non-party, 
managing agent or custodial officer in which practice and 
enforced by the higher courts of the state when considering pro 
se litigants. So let's look at Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, apply Rule 81, subsection E of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and then review Rule 4-F of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and you're with a clear and specific 
instruction in processing the commencement of a prisoner's 
request and demand for 120-day disposition that are guaranteed 
to him within the provisions of 77-29-1; for I placed my 
request and demand for 120-day speedy trial in the mailbox of 
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Section F of Uintah Five on December 9, 2004 addressed to the 
DR Records Office, Alberta Smith, for the processing of the 
120-day disposition, i.e. certified mail in which actions are 
covered in Rule 4-F, subection 2 and 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and therefore, we need to look no further, or 
Title 77-28-1 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is so 
vague that it does not specifically state whom should be in 
receipt of the written request to begin the given time frame of 
120 days for it is the basic principle of due process that any 
law needs to be void of vagueness for which would offend many 
important values of our judicial system and constitution. So 
calculating any time frame between December 9, 2003 and today, 
they have all exceeded the prescribed time frame of 120 days 
even in light of the continuances for they lack good cause 
shown of why they don't meet the prescribed time frame of Rule 
2 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; therefore, all 
charges should be dismissed with prejudice and an order of 
release issued pursuant to the Title 77-29-1 subsection 4. 
THE COURT: Okay, does the State wish to be heard? 
MR. SEARLE: Yes. First of all, the Court's actually 
- the prosecutor must file a case within a reasonable time 
frame after receiving the case on his desk. Now, the 
reasonable time is viewed in all the facts. This case wasn't 
filed until first of all January 12 because we had not received 
from the Utah State Fire Marshall who had retired and gone into 
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private practice, their report. Therefore, you cannot demand 
of the State 120-day disposition in cases in which it is still 
investigating. The State, what I'm saying is the state cannot 
delay filing something just to delay. There has to be a reason 
why. The reason being, not completing the investigation. So, 
120 days as far as the State goes, doesn't even start until 
January 12th because it's pending matters. It's matters which 
have been filed. You can't force 120-day disposition on a 
matter that is under investigation. That's why the two play 
hand in hand in that the state can't avoid the 120 by saying, 
"Well, I didn't file it until this date unless it has good 
cause." The good cause being, it is still under investigation. 
Okay? So, his filing of his 120-day disposition back in 
November, December, it doesn't matter when he filed it. It 
doesn't become applicable to the state until January 12th when 
this matter gets filed by the State. The State files as soon 
as it receives the State Fire Marshall's investigative report. 
You take the 120 days from January 12th. Well, we had a trial 
set in this matter that would have been set within and would 
have gone off within the 120 days but for - this trial was set 
on— 
THE COURT: May 6th - May 25th. 
MR. SEARLE: Yeah, and then it just - they weren't 
ready to go on May 6th. So then it gets continued past there 
and now we sit here. So, he would have had his trial within 
1 his 120-day disposition but for the fact that they were not 
2 prepared to go on May 6th. So the 120-day disposition, many 
3 legal terms could be - it's a moot point because 120 days, four 
4 months from January 12 gets us into May 12 and it's even a 
5 J little longer because there's not 31 days or 30 days in 
6 February, he would have had his trial. But then on that day 
7 they come and say we're not ready to proceed to trial because 
8 we need XX' witness or we need to interview this person. As a 
9 matter of fact, I remember what it was, it's we need an expert 
10 to counter your expert, so we're not ready to go forward on May 
11 6th. So, it's not the state's problem that this trial didn't 
12 go forward on May 6th, it's the defendant's problem and not he 
* 13 comes in here and wants to claim that the case ought to be 
14 dismissed for a 120-day disposition when he would have had his 
15 trial within his 120 days. 
16 As far as - I think my wife wishes I coordinated it 
17 with her as much as he claims I coordinated with his defense 
| 18 attorneys and other individuals. When I read this this morning 
19 it did ring a bell. I spoke with somebody from the Department 
20 of Corrections who informed me that he had filed the 120-day 
21 disposition. That was the extent of our conversation. There 
22 I were never conversations. There was never coordinating to 
123 I relieve somebody of some duty. There was "You, Mr. Prosecutor, 
24 | better be aware that there's a 120-day disposition filed, a 
25 I grievance has been filed with the Department of Corrections, 
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1 insure that you are aware that this 120 days is moving 
2 forward.". So I look forward to - I left private practice six 
3 and a half years ago. I look forward to how I violated my 
4 private and government practice ethics from something I did six 
5' and a half years ago before I even knew Mr. Legg so I'm looking 
6 forward with bated breath to the Bar's letter to me. 
7 I don't know how he complains of the 120, when he 
8 would have had his trial within the 120, but for his request 
9 for an extension for an expert witness to counter the State's 
10 fire marshall. I don't know how else to respond. He would 
11 have had his trial. He would have had his trial in June. Then 
12 I believe he would have had his trial in - no, I misspoke. He 
13 would have had his trial in May. Then they continued so they 
14 could get an expert. Then we would have had his trial in July. 
15 Then he fires his attorneys and— 
16 THE COURT: He was also injured by a sock with 
17 (inaudible). 
18 MR. SEARLE: At which he asked for a continuance and 
19 we don't have an objection to his continuance that he requests. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Legg, or Mr. 
21 Hogan? 
22 MR. LEGG: Yes, I would like to make comment to his 
23 statement here. The investigation is part of the procedures of 
24 affording even a person in society the rights to a speedy 
25 trial. There's other provisions that— 
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THE COURT: Mr. Legg, it would be best for you to 
look at me because I'm the person who makes the decision. 
MR. LEGG: I'm sorry, Your Honor, because I have a 
problem. I have to concentrate in my thinking. 
THE COURT: I thought you were just looking at the 
prosecutor to make that argument. 
MR. LEGG: No, no, no. 
THE COURT: Address your remarks to me. 
MR. LEGG: I'm just thinking. 
THE COURT: If it helps you, you may look to the side 
or whatever you need to do. 
MR. LEGG: There's other provisions that protect a 
person to the rights to a speedy trial and if I'm not mistaken, 
it's Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure entitled 7 6 
- I can't remember it but the investigation is part of that and 
the prosecutor should have afforded me - I mean that was 42 
days from the time I was arrested. This statute is by Morsey 
v. Brewer, there's got to be a certain time frame to afford a 
due process hearing. Now, regardless of the fact of being an 
investigator or not, that wasn't brought to the Court's 
attention that they needed an extended amount of time. There 
wasn't ever a motion ever filed in that regards or you could 
have made - that was why I cited Rule 2 and the time frame of 
the continuances fell below the 5-day time frame and I never 
even agreed to that. That's why I had to raise a conflict of 
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1 interest between me and my attorney to the courts which I was 
2 granted because I was like, how many continuances do we need 
3 and all you have to do is refer back to the docketing 
4 statement. I mean, they're filed the day before. There's 
5 suppose to be five days in advance. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Hogan, anything you wish to add? 
7 MR. HOGAN: Judge, you shouldn't be confused. He was 
8 arrested November 30th, a Board of Pardons warrant. His due 
9 process is with the Board of Pardons. We did not issue a Board 
10 of Pardons warrant so we're not required under some - again, 
11 the due process that we give is it has to be filed within a 
12 J reasonable time frame when the investigation is complete. You 
13 cannot delay or drag it out, okay? So November 30th he's 
14 arrested, the Board of Pardons issues a warrant. You don't 
15 issue a warrant. We're not even holding him as of December 2. 
16 The Board of Pardons takes him, holds him and transports him to 
17 prison. This Court never begins to hold him until January 
18 12th, 2004. The Board of Pardons is holding him and that's a 
19 distinct point that needs to be made because that's why his 
20 120-day disposition doesn't begin to run until this Court 
21 begins to hold him. So when he-asked about a due process or 
22 afford a due process. Afford a due process would have been 
23 under the Board of Pardons hearing that he had there as to 
24 violating his parole. This Court never held him in violation 
25 | of any due process. His due process came when on January 12th 
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1 a warrant was issued and then this Court began to hold him, 
2 then there was a pretrial conference, then there was a 
3 preliminary hearing. Those things then proceeded along. So, 
4 | it shouldn't be confused that he was denied due process from 
5 November 30th to January 12th because it was the Board of 
6 Pardons holding him, not this Court. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Let me just note for the 
8 record that I've had this motion argued to me once before and 
9 I've already ruled denying it and I'll deny.it again for the 
10 reasons set forth in my prior order as well as the reasons I'll 
11 J add today and that is, the date pursuant to 77-29-1, 
12 disposition of detainers against prisoners begins to run from 
13 the point in time that the information is filed. The 
14 information was filed, a copy of which is in my file on January 
15 12th. That would indicate that 120 days was May 29. These 
16 matters were set for trial on May 5th and I believe May 25th if 
17 my recollection serves me, May 6th it looks like and May 25, 
18 well within the 120 days. Extension has been granted as a 
19 result of requests by counsel and they're reasonable. The date 
20 and time set for a speedy trial was reasonable and so they're 
21 denied. Now having said that, let's set this for trial again, 
22 set them both for trial. Actually I only have one in front of 
23 me but— 
24 MR. SEARLE: And Judge, because I don't want to come 
25 back here again, there is a motion he filed where - and it was 
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